Before a palletizing robot starts operation, safety is not determined by the machine itself, but by whether all starting conditions have been correctly confirmed. Operators must ensure that no personnel are inside the working area, the conveyor system is in a normal state, the recipe parameters are correctly selected, and the operating speed is kept within a safe range (typically below 30%). Many accidents do not happen during operation, but at the moment when the system has already started while people are still inside the robot’s working logic zone.
The emergency stop button has a very direct function: it does not prevent problems, but interrupts the continuation of a problem. When an abnormal situation occurs—such as personnel intrusion, mechanical failure, or product drop risk—pressing the emergency stop immediately stops all robot axis movements and terminates the current execution process. However, it is important to understand that the emergency stop does not evaluate whether a risk has already occurred; it simply forces the system to cut off its motion logic and stop further action.
In real operation, safety does not rely only on the emergency stop, but is determined by the combination of speed control, spatial boundaries, and operator attention. Low-speed operation is not about reducing efficiency, but about providing reaction time for humans; the robot operates within its own coordinate workspace, but risks often arise when humans enter the system’s calculated space; at the same time, many incidents are caused by incorrect operations or misjudged system status, which are essentially “attention gaps” during operation.
The anti-collision function in modern palletizing systems is an auxiliary safety mechanism. It detects abnormal load, torque, or motion resistance changes and triggers a stop when contact occurs. However, it is fundamentally a reactive system—it only acts after physical interaction has already happened. Therefore, it cannot replace physical safety protections such as safety fences, light curtains, or restricted access zones. Under heavy loads or complex conditions, residual risks still exist.
The most overlooked risk occurs after reset. Many operators resume production immediately after clearing alarms, but at this stage, system status, personnel positioning, and conveyor conditions may not be fully synchronized. Restarting the system without confirming safety can easily lead to secondary accidents. The correct procedure should always be: stop operation → verify system status → clear the working area → restart the system. This sequence is more critical than any built-in safety function.
